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PATENTS AND
MONOPOLIZATION: THE ROLE
OF PATENTS UNDER SECTION
TWO OF THE SHERMAN ACT
RAMON A. KLITZKE*
Section Two of the Sherman Act1 proscribes monopoliza-
tion, a broad, ambiguous term that is susceptible of myriads of
diverse interpretations in the complex world of business com-
petition. Perceptions of monopolization as unlawful, anticom-
petitive behavior vary widely, depending upon the various
competitive methods utilized to achieve the monopolization.
Some of these methods, such as the patent grant, are explicitly
sanctioned by statutes and are therefore not unlawful. The
patent grant, which is ostensibly a legal monopoly, 2 can be
forged by its owner into a most powerful anticompetitive
weapon that may be used to transcend the legal limits of its
use. In numerous ways it may become a principal actor in the
monopolization that is prohibited by Section Two. In active
business competition, the patent is a forceful commodity
which, if not exploited with great care, can serve only to trans-
form legal aggressive market rivalry into illegal anticompeti-
tive conduct. The economic progress of an expanding
enterprise can thereby be unnecessarily obstructed by
threatened antitrust litigation under the Sherman Act.
Business persons frequently labor under misapprehension
at each end of the wide spectrum of permissible patent utiliza-
tion. At one extreme there may be unnecessary underuse of
patent protection. Hesitancy in full utilization of the legal
limits of the patent grant may result in denying the public the
benefit of a valuable economic asset.3 At the other end of the
spectrum, however, the patent may be used to exert anticom-
petitive pressures in areas not contemplated by the statutory
* B.S., Illinois Institute of Technology; J.D., Indiana University; LL.M., New
York University; Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
2. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
3. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW § 178 (1977).
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grant. In those instances, unanticipated collisions with the
prohibitions of the antitrust statutes harvest a plethora of
harsh penalties.4
Certain types of patent utilization are particularly prob-
lematic when evaluated under Section Two. The quantity and
quality of patent accumulation, pooling agreements between
multiple patent owners, and various intricate patent licensing
and conveyancing schemes are examples of types of patent
utilization that are carefully scrutinized by the courts in deter-
mining whether Section Two has been violated. Extraordi-
nary patent utilization in a monopolized relevant market
receives much well-deserved judicial attention in antitrust
cases.
Many patent-antitrust cases involve allegations of viola-
tions of both Sections One and Two of the Sherman Act.
Business conduct that results in an antitrust violation cannot
be as clearly defined under Section Two as is possible under
Section One. This article will focus primarily on Section Two
and its application to patent utilization. The article will at-
tempt to trace the boundary line separating permissible use of
patents and impermissible uses, violative of Section Two.
I. MONOPOLIZATION UNDER SECTION Two OF THE
SHERMAN ACT
A. Monopoly Power
On its face, Section Two of the Sherman Act prohibits
three distinct offenses: (1) monopolization, (2) attempts to
monopolize, and (3) combination or conspiracy to monopo-
lize.5 In most reported cases, the courts do not attempt to
separate the three offenses. Instead, the prohibitions are
merged into a general monopolization discussion. Specifi-
4. See Kennedy, Patent and Antitrust Policy: The Search for a Unitary Theory, 35
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 512, 559 (1966-67).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 2 reads:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
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cally, monopolization is the actual achieving or maintaining of
monopoly power in a relevant market. To be guilty of monop-
olization, a defendant need only exhibit a general intent or
deliberateness in obtaining or maintaining monopoly power.s
To be guilty of attempting, combining or conspiring to mo-
nopolize, a defendant need not have achieved monopolization
as long as there is a dangerous probability that it could have
been achieved.7 However, proof is needed to show a specific
intent to accomplish an unlawful result.8 Unlike Section One
of the Sherman Act,9 which requires at least two separate enti-
ties to contract or combine to unreasonably restrain trade,
Section Two can be violated by a single business competitor.
Section Two outlaws the acquisition of monopoly power.
Monopoly power is the power to fix prices or exclude or re-
strict competition in a relevant market,10 the power need not
actually be exercised. The relevant market is defined both ge-
ographically and by the product or service marketed by the
monopolist." The relevant product or service market is deter-
mined by the substitutability (i.e., the cross-elasticity of de-
mand) of other products or services for that allegedly
monopolized.12 Because a patented product is, by definition,
novel and is frequently quite unique, it can sometimes consti-
6. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), See also
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966), where the Court explains
that:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1)
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or devel-
opment as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.
7. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946).
8. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 432; Griffith, 334 U.S. at 105.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
10. United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391, 394-96
(1956).
11. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 517 (1978).
12. See L. Sullivan supra note 3, at 30-33, 51-63. See generally Grinnell, 384 U.S.
at 570-76; Du Pont, 351 U.S. at 394-404; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n. 31 (1953). For an excellent discussion of the relevant mar-
ket in antitrust law, see Note, The Market: A Concept in Antitrust, 54 COLUM. L. REv.
580 (1954).
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tute the entire relevant market itself in the absence of substi-
tutable other products.
The exclusive rights granted under a patent should not be
equated with those acquired through an illegal monopoly, at
least not the traditional kind of monopoly that precipitated
the first English patent law.13 The classical monopoly ex-
cluded the public from an economic good that was theretofore
available to it."4 A modem patent, on the other hand, is
granted only if the invention is not obvious to one skilled in
that technical art. 5 Therefore the patent grant takes nothing
from the public that had been available to it,16 but merely rec-
ognizes an invention that was not previously known. The pat-
ent grant allows the inventor to monopolize the limited fruits
of intellectual endeavor. Moreover, the patent is granted only
upon the condition that the inventor fully disclose the particu-
lar means for reproducing the invention. 17
In the practical application of Section Two of the Sherman
Act, a patent grant, although not a traditional monopoly, ap-
pears to partake of a species of power that quite closely resem-
bles the monopoly power addressed by the statute. 8 The
13. The Statute of Monopolies, Statute 21 Jac.I.ch.3 (1623).
14. A good example of this is playing cards. In the 16th century, Queen Elizabeth
granted a monopoly in playing cards to one Darcy. The English aristocracy was en-
raged and the monopoly thereby overshadowed the prior monopolies granted in soap,
alum and saltpeter, and was a factor which precipitated the Statute of Monopolies.
Darcy v. Allen, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
16. Chief Justice White, in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911), quoted Lord Coke in holding that only unreasonable restraints were to be out-
lawed by the Sherman Act. Lord Coke had defined monopoly as an institution or Regal
grant that restrained any freedom of manufacturing or trading which any person had
before the grant. Id. at 51.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
18. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the patent grant as a
"legal monopoly." See, eg., Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91
(1902)("The very object of [the patent] laws is monopoly. ... ); United States v. Uni-
vis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) ("The declared purpose of the patent law is to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts by granting to the investor a limited
monopoly .. "); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) ("The
grant of a patent is the grant of a statutory monopoly .. "); Blonder-Tongue Labora-
tories,Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971) ("Although recognizing
the patent system's desirable stimulus to invention, we have also viewed the patent as a
monopoly which, although sanctioned by law, has the economic consequence attending
other monopolies"). See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
104 S. Ct. 774, 782 (1984); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176
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owner of the patent has the right to exclude others from mak-
(1980); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). Perhaps a bet-
ter way to describe a patent was given by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting, 441 U.S. 1, 28 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting):
"[a] patent is a statutory grant of monopoly privileges."
In a speech delivered to the Seminar Services International Conference on U.S. Pat-
ent Practice, Assistant Attorney General J. Paul McGrath criticized the Supreme
Court's "traditional, though ill-conceived, notion" that patent laws create "monopo-
lies" which conflict with the procompetitive policies underlying antitrust laws. Mc-
Grath, Patent Licensing: A Fresh Look at Antitrust Principles in a Changing Economic
Environment, 27 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 624, 626 (1984). In par-
ticular McGrath criticized the language used by the Supreme Court in its recent deci-
sion, Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984). Though not a
patent case, the Court explained in dictum that "if the government has granted the
seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability
to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market power." Id. at 1560. McGrath
takes exception to this conclusion, explaining that, in reality, the "patents rarely give
their owners anything approaching a monopoly." McGrath, Patent Licensing, at 626.
The United States Supreme Court has also stated that, because the patent grant is a
legal monopoly, it is thus "an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to
the right to access to a free and open market." Precision Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Main-
tenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945). See also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v.
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) ("Proof of [fraudulent patent
procurement] would be sufficient to strip Food Machinery of its exemption from the
Antitrust Laws"); Robb Container Corp. v. Sho-Me Co., 566 F. Supp. 1143, 1156 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) ("Actions within the scope of a patent grant are thus in certain respects ex-
empt from federal antitrust laws"); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d
642, 642-47 (9th Cir. 1981) ("There is an obvious tension between the patent laws and
antitrust laws. One body of law creates and protects monopoly power while the other
seeks to proscribe it."). See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 505 ("Let there be no
pretense that the patent system is not in potential collision with antitrust; it clearly is.").
But see Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 25 (1912) ("The
Sherman Act and the patent laws were passed under separate grants of constitutional
power and do not affect each other."). Two federal circuit cases have recently expressed
disagreement with this characterization of the role between patent and antitrust law. In
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sow & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984) the
court, answering an argument that a fraudulent procurement of a patent should be a per
se violation of Section Two of the Sherman Act, explained, "[t]he patent system which
antedated the Sherman Act by a century, is not an 'exception' to the antitrust laws, and
patent rights are not legal monopolies in the antitrust sense of that word." Id. at 1367.
The court in Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782 (Fed. Cir. 1983), in a footnote,
elaborated further:
A patent, under the statute, is property. 35 U.S.C. § 261. Nowhere in any
statute is a patent described as a monopoly. The patent right is but the right to
exclude others, the very definition of "property." That the property right repre-
sented by a patent, like other property rights, may be used in a scheme violative
of antitrust laws creates no 'conflict' between laws establishing any of those
property rights and the antitrust laws. A valid patent gives the public what it
did not have earlier. Patents are presumed valid under the statute. 35 U.S.C.
§ 282. It is but an obfuscation to refer to a patent as "the patent monopoly" or
to describe a patent as an "exception to the general rule against monopolies."
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ing, using or selling the patented invention for seventeen
years.1 9 Thus, there is power to exclude competition - power
that happens also to be a key ingredient in Section Two viola-
tions. Consequently, it is necessary to forge a compromise be-
tween the conflicting policies of rewarding the inventor for the
voluntary public disclosure of the invention while protecting
the public from untoward intrusions into the domain of a free
and open competitive market in which all competitors can
participate without unreasonable restraints.
B. The Monopolized Market
When Section Two is called upon to stem monopoliza-
tion,20 the first step is to ascertain the existing monopoly
Id. at 786 n.3 (emphasis in original).
The argument concerning the relationship between patent law and antitrust law may
be more theoretical than real. Although patent grants are not classical monopolies, the
fact that the patent owner has the right to exclude others from making, using or selling
an economic good is equivalent to having a monopoly in the good. The more unusual
the new invention or discovery, the more market power the patent owner has. Also, to
say that the patent grant is not an exception to antitrust law because patent law pre-
ceded antitrust law by a century is to ignore the origins of American patent and anti-
trust law. Both areas of law originated in The Statute of Monopolies, enacted in
England in 1623. Section I of the Statute forbids monopolies. Section VI creates an
exception for "letters patents" to the "true and first inventor" so long as the patent "be
not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state, by raising prices of commodities at
home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient." Thus the statute itself acknowl-
edged the inherent conflict between patent and antitrust law. This tension between pat-
ent and antitrust law is still very real. See W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST
LAW, 1-14 (1973). For a history of patent law see THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT
PRACTICE & INVENTION MANAGEMENT, 384-404 (R. Calvert ed. 1964).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
20. Section Two prohibits monopolization because it interferes with a basic tenet of
antitrust law - free and healthy competition. In seeking to promote competition, the
Supreme Court has exercised special care in protecting the small competitor. See, e.g.,
United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), affid, 414 U.S. 801 (1973)
where the Court explains:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection
of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and
every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete - to assert with
vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can
muster.
Id. at 610. See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). Some
authorities are critical of this approach and believe that the antitrust laws should not be
so protective of small competitors to the detriment of large competitors. See, e.g., Bork
& Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 363, 369-70 (1965). See also
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PA TENTS AND MONOPOLIES
power in carefully defined relevant product and geographic
markets. The degree of competition prevalent in a given rele-
vant market can vary considerably. The highest degree of fair
competition is called "pure competition." "Pure competi-
tion" in the market for a completely homogeneous commodity
could exist if there were many competing firms selling identi-
cal commodities and the share of each individual firm was so
small that no single firm could influence price significantly by
varying its output quantity.21 Pure competition can exist only
in the rarest of markets. The direct antithesis of pure compe-
tition is the "pure monopoly." In a "pure monopoly" a single
firm controls the entire supply of a commodity and no other
firm can market a suitable substitute. 22 There is no competi-
tion. Most markets fall somewhere between these two ex-
tremes. A patented product market is closer to a pure
monopoly.
The market with which Section Two of the Sherman Act
is concerned is characterized either by the dominance of a few
firms, i.e., an oligopoly, or by the dominance of a single firm
that controls a substantial share of the market. Such concen-
trated industries as the oil and automobile industries are ex-
amples of oligopolistic markets that have generated important
antitrust litigation because of the anticompetitive practices
that have abounded. It is the concentration of monopoly
power in the hands of a few that kindles the spark of illegal
monopolization.
A firm need not dominate a national market in order for it
to violate Section Two. The relevant market is defined geo-
graphically and, if the geographical market is defined nar-
rowly enough, it is possible for a firm of moderate size to
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963). Most of the re-
ported cases involve large competitors; the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission are not often troubled by the antitrust violations of small firms. However,
often it is only the large firms that can avail themselves of the most efficient production
and marketing techniques and thereby attain the lowest marginal costs. By the same
token, small firms may monopolize small markets and, because of their lower efficien-
cies, greater public harm thereby results.
21. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 11, at 402.
22. Id. at 1 403.
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monopolize.23 Relevant markets may be defined locally,24 re-
gionally,25 or nationally.26 The relevant geographic market
may be determined by the location of a number of competitors
in a particular industry or by customer recognition of a sepa-
rate geographical area of competition, taking into considera-
tion costs of transportation or situational features that attract
certain producers. The relevant geographic market may be a
state, a city, or even a number of cities of a particular size.
Similarly, the relevant product market is capable of being
defined in a number of ways, depending upon the sub-
stitutability of the product of various competitors. Determi-
nation of the market depends upon how different the offered
products are in character, function, or use as well as to what
extent buyers will readily substitute one product for another.27
It is in this step of the monopolization analysis that the exist-
ence of a patented product assumes major significance. The
more unique the product, the more inelastic will be the cross-
elasticity of demand with other products. A basic patent pro-
tecting a pioneering product may allow the consumer no alter-
native at all. Such a basic patent thereby protects a complete
monopoly of the relevant product market. This monopoly
does not, however, result in a violation of Section Two if other
condemning circumstances are absent. Illegal monopolization
depends upon the relative market dominance of the patent
and the manner in which the patent is utilized to control other
markets or unduly restrict other competitors.
23. In United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. 350 (1970), the defendant
banks ranked 1346th and 2429th nationally among U.S. banks with trust powers. The
Court held that a proposed merger of the two would violate Section 7 of the Clayton
Act because there would be a substantial lessening of competition. Id. at 353. There
was already undue concentration of banking services in the relevant geographic market,
which was an area having a population of about 60,500.
24. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Kansas City Star Co.
v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
25. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); Indiana Farmer's
Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934).
26. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 1966; United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
27. See United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956).
The Du Pont Court's use of the cross-elasticity concept has been severely criticized. See
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 53-58; Marcus, Antitrust Bugbears: Substitute Products-
Oligopoly, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 185 (1956); Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane
Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1956).
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C. Dominance as a Factor in Monopolization
When extensive patent power is coupled with dominant
market size, the opportunity for violation of Section Two in-
creases geometrically. The dominant firm must tread the
market carefully so as to avoid any competitive conduct that
may be viewed as an attempt to exclude other competitors
from a fair share of the market. Any conduct suggestive of
market control by the dominant firm will be suspect. Thus,
market dominance by itself does not indict the powerful com-
petitor. Size does, however, provide an opportunity for abuse
that courts do not ignore when the competitor has a history of
anticompetitive behavior.28
What is meant by dominance, of course, is a commanding
share of the relevant product or service market. There is no
particular percentage of the market to which one can point as
a line of demarcation separating monopolization from non-
monopolization. Control of as little as 60% of a market in
one case was held to be a monopoly. 29 In another case, how-
ever, control of as much as 64% of a market did not constitute
monopoly power.3 0 The proportion of a market controlled
is therefore not always the determinative factor in
monopolization.
The larger, dominant manufacturing firm frequently ac-
quires a strong patent position as a direct result of its research
and development operations. Vigorous acquisition of patents
or aggressive prosecution of patent rights against competitors
is an important factor in the determination of the intent neces-
sary to show a violation of Section Two. The use of the patent
grant that brings the competitor within the ambit of Section
Two has been aptly termed "exclusionary conduct. ' 31 The
term defines the legal limits of patent use which are permissi-
ble. For example, if a dominant firm uses its patent position
to exclude competition in products not covered by its patents,
Section Two is obviously violated. If a dominant firm confines
28. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932).
29. Amplex of Md., Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968).
30. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
31. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at § 179; P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 11,
at 70-79. See also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D.
Mass. 1953), ajfd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
1985]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
its exclusionary activity to those products protected by its pat-
ents, no violation normally results. The thorny problem faced
by the dominant firm is that almost any aggressive sales pro-
motion aimed at competing firms can be viewed as exclusion-
ary in nature. Courts are quite willing to find anticompetitive
intent even in those business operations that would be charac-
terized by a business person as vigorously competitive.
II. UTILIZATION AS EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
In the context of Section Two of the Sherman Act, exclu-
sionary conduct may be defined as competitive behavior that
not only unnecessarily impairs the competitive opportunities
of rival firms but also does not compete on the qualitative
merits of the product.3 2 To increase the share of the market,
and thereby reduce other competitors' shares does no violence
to the policy underlying the Sherman Act if the quality of the
product is superior to that of the other competitors. However,
to use a dominant market position unfairly so as to exclude
rivals from healthy and meaningful competition can violate
Section Two, depending upon the particular means used. Pat-
ent ownership can be one such means.
The patent grant bestows a number of competitive advan-
tages that would transgress the Sherman Act, were it not for
the patent. For example, patent licensors are permitted to fix
the prices to be charged by licensees.33 Licensors may divide
market territorial rights between competitors who desire to
make, use, or sell the patented products. This may be done by
a license,34 or by the grant of an assignment. 35 Most impor-
tantly, of course, deliberate monopolization of a market
32. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 11, at 78-79.
33. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926). The General
Electric decision has been limited and extensively criticized by many decisions and com-
mentators although it has yet to be overruled. See, e.g., United States v. New Wrinkle,
Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 378 (1952); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364 (1948); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); United States v.
Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp 791 (E.D. Mich. 1964), affd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 382 U.S. 197 (1965); Price, Price Restrictive Patent Licenses, 50 J. PAT.
OFP. Soc'y 127 (1968).
34. Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1954);
Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982).
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through the patent grant is the very reward that the patent
statutes are designed to protect.36
A. Exclusive Licensing
A patent owner is permitted to negotiate any number of
licenses with licensees who compete with each other in a given
geographical territory. Alternatively, the patent owner may
license but a single licensee in a given territory. The patent
owner may be able to maximize profits by granting numerous
licenses and allowing the licensees to compete freely without
restrictions. However, there are instances in which exclusive
licensing will produce greater net profits in the long run.
Three situations provide a patent owner with a profitable
opportunity to license exclusively. First, in a new product
market, the profit maximizing license royalty might be incal-
culable. This is a situation of doubtful importance that would
exist for only a short period of time.37 Second, few licensees
may be willing to risk the necessary capital investment if they
must compete with other licensees. Moreover, the patent
owner might be unable to finance the exploitation of the pat-
ent in all markets. Third, the exclusive license can be used as
a device to fix prices or divide markets a.3  Exclusive licensing
is the only fair solution to the second problem and should be
freely allowed by the courts.39 In the third situation, there is
high probability for a Sherman Act violation and exclusive li-
censing must be exercised with great care. The exclusive li-
censee has a practical monopoly and, if the licensor has
divided territories or has separated fields of use, the licensor
has created a restraint of trade between horizontally compet-
ing licensees. 40 Many of such restraints have been declared to
36. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942). See also Be-
ment v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
37. In this situation the patent owner shares the monopoly with the single licensee,
who then shares the revenues and profits with the patent owner. P. AREEDA, ANTI-
TRUST ANALYSIS 585 (3d ed. 1981).
38. These three possibilities are discussed in P. AREEDA. Id
39. Id. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cerL denied,
455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
40. See generally United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118 (N.D.
Ill. 1956).
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be unreasonable per se under Section One of the Sherman
Act.41
The grant of an exclusive license, standing alone, is not a
violation of the antitrust laws because such licenses are clearly
within the contemplation of the patent statutes. 42 Restrictions
in patent licenses are upheld if they can be construed to be
ancillary to the statutory patent grant.43 In one case, a provi-
sion which would terminate an exclusive license if the licen-
see's use of the patents fell below a prescribed level was
upheld because the licensee was not required to use the li-
censed products to the exclusion of all other products. 44
To provide a licensee with the exclusive rights within a
field of use or territory is to exclude even the licensor from the
practice of the invention, unless the licensor expressly reserves
such right. Where the licensor and the licensee have previ-
ously been competitors, problems under Section One of the
Sherman Act may arise if the mutual restraints are deemed
unreasonable. 45 As contrasted with a nonexclusive license, the
exclusive license usually provides for a high royalty rate and a
minimum annual royalty. The exclusive licensee is willing to
agree to this in return for the exclusion of competition and the
isolation of the licensee's share of the market.
The resulting consequences under Section Two of the
Sherman Act depend upon the licensee's market dominance
and other exclusionary conduct, if any.4 6 The exclusive li-
41. See id. at 129-30 for examples of such violations.
42. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 94 (1902); Moraine Prod. v. ICI
Am. Inc., 538 F.2d 134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976); Brownell v.
Ketchum Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954).
43. Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49, 52 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 830 (1949).
44. Hensley Equip. Co., Inc. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1967).
45. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. at 128-30.
46. See, ag., L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC., 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971) (seller already in
possession of monopoly power over a market accumulated exclusive dealing contracts
with buyers and with suppliers; such contracts were a "prerequisite for participation" in
the market); Western Geophysical Co. of Am. v. Bolt Assoc., Inc., 305 F. Supp. 1248
(D. Conn. 1969) (exclusive license to key technology acquired by a dominant firm);
Munsters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (protection
of the patent cannot be stretched so far as to continue the monopoly after the sale of the
product nor will the patent on a component element protect essentially unpatentable
machines employing the patented element); Chandler v. Stem Dental Laboratory Co.,
335 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Tex. 1971)(allegation that defendant used exclusive license to
conspire to monopolize by suppressing sales of patent product and promoting sales of
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cense permits the licensee to sue infringers and may even re-
quire it to do so. Where there had been a prior pattern of
patent enforcement by the licensee, and market dominance
has been attained, the exclusive license becomes but one more
highly visible factor in the determination of the deliberateness
or intent with which the licensee has maintained its monopoly
or attempt to monopolize. 47
Exclusive licenses usually contain clauses providing that
the licensor may convert the license to a nonexclusive one if
royalties fall below a specified minimum. Because the licensor
has become locked into the exclusive arrangement, such con-
version clauses are necessary to protect against the possibility
that the patent owner may be frozen out of the legitimate re-
ward due. However, these clauses may offer further opportu-
nity for manipulation of the competitive scheme because of
the options available to the licensor. While a change from ex-
clusive licensing to nonexclusive licensing will usually en-
hance competition, the ultimate effect depends upon the
character of the newly admitted competitors. If the exclusive
license has allowed a moderately sized firm to compete, re-
placement by a dominant firm, which could even be the licen-
sor itself, may further concentrate monopoly power in the
dominant firm.
B. Territorial Allocation Of Markets
Agreements between horizontal competitors to allocate
territories are per se illegal under Section One of the Sherman
Act.48 In an oligopolistic market, territorial allocation be-
tween firms would also violate Section Two. Competing firms
sometimes achieve a simpler and fairer method of market allo-
other products); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), affid, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (finding of monopolization based in part on United
Shoe's accumulation of third party patents on an exclusive basis); United States v.
Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945) (exclusive license to existing
and future patents, trade secrets, and trademarks acquired by dominant firm).
47. See Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952), cerL
denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
48. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 801
(1973).
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cation by allocating customers and refusing to deal with each
other's customers. 49
The Sherman Act can also be violated by a single firm if it
has the power to allocate sales territories for competitors at a
lower level of product distribution.50 A common method of
territorial allocation is through the franchise of a trademark
or service mark." The exclusive common law right to the use
of a trademark is licensed through franchises and the
franchisor may impose numerous types of restraints on the
franchisees. Franchise licenses are quite similar in effect to
patent licenses and identical goals are frequently sought. Ter-
ritorial allocation is the most frequent goal of franchise
arrangements.
The patent franchise, or, the patent grant, operates on a
broader plane of power than the trademark franchise. The
patent grant confers greater power because of its greater ex-
clusivity. Unlike the trademark, the statutory patent grant al-
lows its owner to exclude others from making, using or selling
the invention even in markets where the owner has yet to
make any inroads and may never intend to do so. Although it
is true that federal registration of a trademark constitutes no-
tice throughout the United States of the ownership and use of
a mark,52 the test for infringement of a trademark, which is
one of "confusing similarity, ' 53 and the "concurrent use" doc-
trine,54 both operate to limit the power to preclude others
from using the mark. The patent grant is not so limited. This
is one reason that territorial allocations through patent licens-
ing can be devastating in excluding competition.
49. In such cases it is not necessary to prove monopoly power in a relevant market.
Rather, it is enough to prove that there was a specific intent to monopolize. United
States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961). If the conduct is
ambiguous, i.e., it is not clear that there was a specific intent to allocate customers, then
market power must be proved. See Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627
F.2d 919, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981).
50. Topco, 405 U.S. 596.
51. Id.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1982).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982).
54. The first use doctrine precludes a trademark registrant from exercising rights
bestowed by the ownership of a registered mark upon another who began using the
same mark upon goods of the same class before the registrant but in a completely sepa-
rate geographic market. 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a)(1982). See E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 265-66 (2d ed. 1982).
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Section 261 of the Patent Code specifically provides:
"The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representa-
tives may in like manner (i.e., by a written instrument) grant
and convey an exclusive right under this application for pat-
ent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United
States."55Thus, when the patent owner creates exclusive terri-
tories for individual licensees, the patent owner is acting
within the scope of the patent grant and does not violate the
antitrust laws.5 6 However, the antitrust laws may come into
play if there are complications due to a concentration of mar-
ket power other than that of the patent itself.57 Exclusive ter-
ritories are created for the purpose of eliminating competition,
not increasing it, and are, thus, carefully scrutinized. When
there is monopoly power in the hands of either the licensor or
a licensee, the scene is ripe for a Sherman Act violation.
The licensor in possession of monopoly power may license
exclusive territories in one of two situations. First, the licen-
sor may wish to allow exploitation of the patent in another
territory while excluding competition from the licensor's own
territory. Second, where the licensor does not compete with
any licensee, territorial allocation may be used to foster the
licensor's monopoly power in other product markets.
When the licensor sells at the same market distribution
level as that of the licensee, the license may enable the licensee
to compete more effectively against competitors who are also
competing against the licensor in related product markets.
The competitive strength of the licensor is not reduced by al-
locating a distant territory to the licensee and may in fact be
considerably aided. If the licensor and the licensee have com-
mon competitors, the licensor has achieved a happy result, in-
deed: the licensor may succeed in cutting into the
competitor's market shares by means of the licensee's efforts
without the need of undue expenditure of the licensor's own
resources. The patent licensor has thus succeeded in effectuat-
ing a horizontal allocation of territories that gains a substan-
55. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982)(emphasis added).
56. Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407, 417 (6th Cir. 1973), cert de-
nied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 128
(9th Cir. 1954); United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp 118, 127 (N.D.
Ill. 1956).
57. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 524.
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tial competitive advantage over sellers of related products.
The patent grant makes this a lawful possibility.
The utilization of the exclusive territorial license to
strengthen a competitor in another market and exclude that
licensee from the patent owner's own territory is not the type
of conduct for which the antitrust lawyer should have great
concern. However, once the condition of a monopolized mar-
ket or a highly concentrated market is overlaid upon such
conduct, serious Section Two questions arise. If, by the means
of the exclusive license, the licensor and the license seek to
maintain already acquired monopoly power in a relevant mar-
ket, Section Two is violated. 8 Similarly, if the license is an
attempt to acquire monopoly power, Section Two is also
violated. 9
When a licensor does not compete with the territorial
licensees, there are two possibilities for antitrust violations.
First, if a combination of conspiracy between the licensees is
found, Section One of the Sherman Act may be violated. 6°
Second, even without such a combination, the licensor may
violate Section Two if monopolization is the goal. There are a
number of market conditions which permit successful applica-
tion of Section Two to exclusive territorial licenses.
A patent owner having monopoly power in a relevant
product market can take steps to maintain that power by se-
lectively assisting firms that compete against the patent
owner's substantial competitors. Business competitors usually
offer a variety of related products or services. Depending
upon the emphasis a firm places on certain of its products, its
profits may vary considerably. The strength of potential com-
petition determines those product markets that the firm will
emphasize. The tactics of competition suggest that a firm
should attempt inroads into those markets that offer the least
resistance, i.e., where the competition is at a palatable level.
But the ability to compete is directly proportional to the total
resources of a firm; inroads into new markets are impossible
58. See generally Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
59. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 524.
60. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., 610 F.2d 1059, 1069-73 (3d Cir.
1979); United States v. Ciba Geigy Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1118, 1149-51 (D.N.J. 1976).
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without the necessary resources. This is where selective terri-
torial licensing can be used most effectively.
The patent owner with a product monopoly who has the
ingenuity to license firms that compete with its strongest com-
petitors can thereby serve the patent owner's own interests.
Exclusive territories can be carefully drawn so as to maximize
the damage to the competitor's market shares and minimize
any damage to the patent owner's position.6 a Competitors can
be injured in this way even when the patent owner's monopoly
power covers products that are not patented. For example,
where a firm has a patented process for making a nonpatented
product, selective territorial licensing of weaker firms who
compete with the licensor's strongest competitors can severly
impair the ability of the stronger firms to compete if the pat-
ented process is more cost-efficient than the process used by
the strong competitors. The licensees can price the product
lower than that of those competitors. Thus, the licensor can
attack the market shares of its competitors, even in those terri-
tories where the licensor does not itself compete. This is
clearly the deliberateness in maintaining a monopoly that vio-
lates Section Two.
C. Field Of Use Restrictions
A patent owner may wish to restrict the licensee's field of
use and may even license a given field of use exclusively to a
single licensee. By use of this method competitors may
thereby be insulated from each other in much the same way
that competitors are separated by means of territorial alloca-
tions. For example, one licensee may be limited to sales of the
patented invention for commercial use, while another licensee
may be permitted to sell for private home use only.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.
1981). In Westinghouse the defendant licensed its foreign patents to Mitsubishi for use
only outside of the United States. The government argued that this agreement was
intended to help Mitsubishi grow into a large corporation like Westinghouse while insu-
lating Westinghouse and the United States market from Mitsubishi's competition in
violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 645-46. The government conceded that Westing-
house's agreement was technically within the law but that the effect of the agreement
unreasonably limited competition in the United States. Id. The court rejected the gov-
ernment's argument because Westinghouse's actions were clearly protected by the pat-
ent laws. Westinghouse merely employed means "normally and reasonably adapted to
secure pecuniary reward for the patent monopoly." Id. at 647.
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A number of reasons may dictate field of use restrictions.
Although most court decisions involving field of use restric-
tions are analyzed as Section One violations, such restrictions
offer potential for violation of Section Two of the Sherman
Act as well. For example, the patent owner may wish to pre-
serve a field of use for itself and still profit from other uses
that the owner is unable to exploit. Another reason may be
the need to charge different royalty rates for different uses.
The case law on use restrictions is not well developed.
Precedents are few and there is scant judicial analysis of anti-
trust issues.62 With this warning in mind, the foray into use
restrictions must begin with the first sale doctrine: a patented
article, once sold, passes outside of the patent monopoly.63
After the first sale, any restrictions on the use of the patented
item are unenforceable. The first sale doctrine applies even
where the purchaser buys the patented product in a territory
licensed to one licensee and then resells the product in another
territory that is allocated to a different licensee. 64 The rule is
based upon the rationale that the patentee received the full
and just reward when the license royalty was paid.65
The proposition that a patentee need not convey full title
of the patent, and that a restrictive patent license is not neces-
sarily unlawful was set forth in dicta in a much-criticized case,
United States v. General Electric Co.66 The Court stated that
"[t]he patentee may grant a license to make, use and vend arti-
cles under the specifications of his patent for any royalty or
upon any condition the performance of which is reasonably
within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the pat-
ent is entitled to secure. ' 67 Although the Court never explic-
itly mentioned field of use restrictions, this language was
quoted with approval and used as a starting point in the lead-
ing case of field of use restrictions.
62. P. AREEDA, supra note 37, at 604.
63. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942); American Indus.
Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enters, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 32, 35-37 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
64. Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895).
65. See Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. at 251-52.
66. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
67. Id. at 489.
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In the leading case, General Talking Pictures Corp. v.
Western Electric Co.,68 American Telephone and Telegraph
and several other companies formed a patent pool which con-
tained patents on vacuum tube amplifiers. The patent owners
subdivided the market into two sections. The first was the
"commercial" field which included sound reproduction sys-
tems for motion picture theaters. Exploitation of the patents
within this field was reserved exclusively for the patent own-
ers. The second was the "home" field, which embraced ampli-
fiers for radio broadcast and amateur radio reception.
Individual amplifiers were physically interchangeable between
the two fields of use.
American Transformer Co. was one of 50 companies given
non-exclusive licenses to manufacture and sell the amplifiers
for "home" use. Pursuant to the license, a notice was at-
tached to each amplifier, warning that it could be used only
for "home" use. American Transformer sold an amplifier to
General Talking Pictures, a manufacturer of equipment for
theaters. Both parties were aware that the sale was outside of
the scope of the license. The patent owners sued General
Talking Pictures to enjoin use of the infringing amplifiers.
The defendants argued that the owner of a patent may not
restrict the use to be made of a device manufactured under the
patent after the device has passed into the hands of a pur-
chaser in the ordinary channels of trade and full consideration
has been paid.6 9 The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
argument, finding the first sale doctrine inapplicable. The li-
censee's sale was not within the limits of its license and there
was no purchase in the ordinary channels of trade because the
purchaser, General Talking Pictures, knew that the license did
not permit such a sale.7° Upon a rehearing, Justice Brandeis
reiterated these reasons. He noted that the practice of grant-
ing licenses with use restrictions was an old one, the legality of
which was never questioned.7 1 The decision implies that the
use restriction was upheld simply because it was an accepted
practice which had gone unquestioned for many years.
68. 304 U.S. 175 (1938), reafl'd on rehearing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
69. Id. at 180.
70. Id. at 180-81.
71. 305 U.S. at 127 (citing Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 NWall. 788, 799-800);
Gamewell Five-Alarm Telegraph Co. v. Brooklyn, 14 F. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1882).
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Although the Court never explicitly considered the validity of
the use restriction, the holding necessarily implies this conclu-
sion. In any event, the case is widely cited as standing for the
proposition that use restrictions are valid.72
To avoid a Sherman Act violation, a patent owner wishing
to restrict the licensee's field of use must know when owner-
ship of the patented item has been parted with under the first
sale doctrine. Although dealing more with price restrictions
than with use restrictions, the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Univis Lens Co. 7 3 has been cited along with
the decision in General Talking Pictures as establishing the
rule concerning field of use restrictions and the first sale doc-
trine.74  The Court in Univis held that when a patent owner
has parted with ownership, restrictions placed upon the use or
resale of the item are invalid under the first sale doctrine.75
72. See United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.h. 670 F.2d 1122, 1132-33
(D.C Cir. 1981); Armstrong v. Motorola, Inc., 374 F.2d 764 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 830 (1967); Turner Glass v. Hartford-Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 83; (1949); Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Prods., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 489,
509 (N.D. Ill 1968), aff'd, 438 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922
(1971); Barr Rubber Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 277 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
aifid, 425 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1978); Chemaio Corp. v.
Universal Chem. Co., 244 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Tex 1965); Harte & Co. v. L.E. Carpenter
& Co., 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 578, 583-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Similiar field of use restric-
tions were present in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 339 U.S. 827
(1950). The First Circuit had upheld the restrictions on the authority of General Talk-
ing Pictures. Automatic Radio Mfg.Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 176 F.2d 799 (1st Cir.
1949), ajffg, 77 F. Supp. 493 (D. Mass. 1948), afld, 339 U.S. 827 (1950). Although the
Supreme Court affirmed this holding, it avoided a reexamination of General Talking
Pictures and declined to reaffirm its holding in that case. The Court found the issue to
be moot because the restrictions were purged before the case came to trial. 339 U.S. at
834-36.
73. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
74. See Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., 450 F. Supp. 1195, 1200-04 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), afld on rehearing, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
75. Univis, 316 U.S. at 251. Univis Lens Co. owned patents on the manufacture of
multifocal eyeglass lenses. The patents were fully practiced only after the eyeglass
blanks were ground and polished into usable lenses. Univis manufactured the lens
blanks and sold them to designated licensees of the corporation at a royalty of 50 cents
per pair. The corporation licensed three classes of licensees: wholesalers, finishing re-
tailers, and prescription retailers. The first two classes of licensees ground and polished
the blanks. Each of the three classes of licensees were required to sell the lenses at
prices fixed by the licensor. No additional royalties were extracted from any of the
licensees. Id. at 243-45. The Supreme Court held that by the first sale of the blanks,
Univis had conferred to the buyer the right to fully practice and patent, Le., to grind
and polish the blanks. All the license restraints after the first sale were illegal; thus,
Univis could not control retail prices, Id. at 249-52.
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The Court reasoned that upon the sale of the patented item
the patent owner realizes the reward contemplated by the pat-
ent laws.76
General Talking Pictures is distinguishable form Univis.
In General Talking Pictures the patent owner granted to the
licensee a license to manufacture and sell the patented item.
In Univis the patent owner manufactured the patented item,
and granted the licensee a license to finish the item and sell it.
The Court held that this was, in effect, a sale of the patented
item rather than a license because the patent owner produced
the item and received a royalty upon transferring the item to
the licensee." Thus, the rule that is drawn from these cases is
that, when a patent owner manufactures and sells the patented
item, the patent owner can exercise no further control over
the purchaser's use of the item. But when the patent owner
grants a license to one to manufacture and sell the patented
item, the patent owner may restrict the licensee in the use or
sale of that item.78 With this rule in mind, it will be helpful to
divide field of use restrictions into three separate categories
and analyze each separately.79
The first classification, known as Class A restrictions, are
those restrictions placed on the patented product after it has
76. Id. at 250-51.
77. Id. at 248-50.
78. Munters, 450 F. Supp. at 1204. The Munters decision provides a good analysis
of the General Talking Pictures and Univis decisions. Munters Corp owned the U.S.
patent rights to a packing material known as "Munters fill" used in the cooling mecha-
nism for gas turbines. Munters sold the fill and also licensed its use. Munters granted
to Buffalo Forge the "exclusive right and sublicense" to use the fill in its manufacture of
turbines of at least 500 h.p.. Burgess, the principal competitor of Buffalo Forge and a
user of Munters fill, objected to the restrictions placed on its use of the product. The
court noted that no royalties were extracted and that the entire consideration paid for
use of the fill was the purchase price paid to Munters. The court cited Univis and held
that the restrictions, though in a "license," were unenforceable. The agreement was in
substance a contract for sale and, having disposed of ownership over the patented fill,
Munters could no longer control its use. Munters, 450 F. Supp. at 1201. The decision in
this case was in part based upon United States v. Arnold, Schwinn and Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1967). Since the Schwinn case was overruled by Continental Television, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), right after the first opinion in Munters, the
court decided to reexamine the case using a rule of reason analysis. However the out-
come was identical. Munters, 201 U.S.P.Q. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aft'd on rehearing,
450 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
79. This technique was utilized in Note, Patent Use Restrictions, 75 HARV. L. REV.
602 (1962).
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been manufactured and sold. An example of this type of re-
striction is found in United States v. The Consolidated Car-
Heating Co. 80 The defendant owned a patent on a metal alloy
and a furnace used to melt it. It "licensed" dental laboratories
to use the patented alloy only in the manufacture of dentures.
The district court held the license restrictions invalid, stating
that the patentee received his reward upon the sale of the pat-
ented product to his licensee.,' General Electric, General
Talking Pictures and Univis were cited as support. s2 In light
of this precedent, the decision seems sound and appears to
represent the trend in the law on this point.8 3 There are deci-
sions holding otherwise, however.8 4
A second classification of patent use restrictions are Class
B restrictions. Class B restrictions are those placed on a licen-
see who manufactures a patented product. The restrictions
may include the types of products the licensee may produce
under a patent covering a component device, or the persons to
whom the product may be sold. General Talking Pictures is
an example of this type. In that case, it will be recalled, the
Supreme Court implicitly upheld use restrictions placed on
the manufacturing licensee of patented amplifiers. As one
80. 87 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
81. Id. at 22-23.
82. Id. at 23. In Note, Patent Use Restrictions, supra note 80, the author classified
this case under "B" restrictions, apparently because the alloy was manufactured into
dentures with the aid of the patented furnace. This author believes it is properly classi-
fied as an "A" restriction since the patent was fully practiced when the alloy was sold to
dental labs.
83. See, e.g., Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys. Co., 268
F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959), aftig, 169 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.
Pa. 1958), which involved a patented strain gauge that had two uses: expandable mem-
ber and permanent component. Sales were made on the condition that the gauges were
to be used in expandable form only. See also Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 383
F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967)(use restrictions on patented excavating teeth purchased from
manufacturer is per se illegal under the Sherman Act) and Munters, 450 F. Supp. 1195
(use of patented coding tower packing material restricted after sale was misuse).
84. See, eg., Chemario Corp. v. Universal Chem. Co., 244 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Tex.
1965) (plaintiff's agricultural chemical sold in 10 per cent concentration to commercial
growers with notice prohibiting dilution to 2 percent concentration which plaintiff sells
to home gardeners; restriction upheld); Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
171 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ohio 1959), rev'd in part but afl'd on this issue, 285 F.2d 928
(6th Cir. 1960) (device used to detect flaws in metal leased to railroads on condition
they be used to inspect rolling stock and not rails; restriction upheld even though
purged in 1955).
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might expect, this case has, for the most part, determined the
law regarding these restrictions.
A similar factual situation arose in Automatic Radio Mfg.
Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 85 Hazeltine owned patents on
several hundred radio and television circuits. Automatic Ra-
dio was licensed to manufacture receivers employing the pat-
ents for educational, and private non-commercial use.
Notices to that effect were required on all apparatus manufac-
tured. Automatic Radio defended a suit for royalties, claim-
ing the restrictive notice constituted patent misuse. Both the
District Court and the First Circuit upheld the restrictions on
the basis of General Talking Pictures.8 6 The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court decisions, but found the legality of
the restrictive notice to be a moot issue.8 7 Prior to the deci-
sion, the restrictive notice provision was eliminated.
Another example of this type of restriction is found in
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Bulldog Electric Products Co. 88
Westinghouse licensed Bulldog to manufacture its patented
circuit breakers, provided that they were incorporated into
larger industrial assemblies. The district court found the re-
strictions proper even though the license restriction had been
purged. 89 The court of appeals affirmed. Other cases simi-
85. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
86. Automatic Radio, 77 F. Supp. 493 (D. Mass. 1948), afid, 176 F.2d 799 (lst Cir.
1949).
87. Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 835.
88. 106 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. W.Va. 1952), af'd, F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
89. 106 F. Supp. at 879.
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larly uphold Class B restrictions. 90 There are, however, cases
in which restrictions of this type have been found invalid.91
The final classification of patent use restrictions, Class C,
are those placed on a licensee of a patented process or
machine which is used to produce an end product which is not
itself patented. A process patent owner can exclude others
from using the process or machine, but cannot exclude others
from making, using or selling the unpatented end product.
92
Class C restrictions have been upheld by courts so long as the
restriction is on the use of the process or machine and not the
unpatented end product. In Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford-
90. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Prod. Co., 206 F.2d at 574 (4th Cir.
1953). See, e.g., In re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litig., 541 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir.
1976)(manufacturing licensees of patented yam producing machines restricted to selling
to specific yam producers; restriction upheld); Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford-Empire
Co., 173 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1949)(patented glassware producing machinery leased upon
the condition that only certain types of glassware be manufactured); Vulcan Mfg. Co. v.
Maytag Co., 73 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1934) (license to manufacture and sell patented
wringers only on certain types of washing machines valid); Bela Seating Co. v. Poloin
Prods. Inc., 297 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd, 438 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971)(manufacturing licensee of a tablet arm design incorporating
into folding chairs restricted including arm in chairs similiar to those it previously man-
ufactured; restriction upheld); Perbal v. Dazor Mfg. Corp., 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 169
(Mo. 1968)(license to manufacture and sell lamps and other devices embodying the pat-
ented swivel joint does not include license to sell swivel joints separately); Benger Labo-
ratories, Ltd. v. R.K. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1962), affdper curiam, 317
F.2d 455 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963) (owner of patented preparation for
treatment of a licensed company to manufacture and sell in the veterinary field and
another company to manufacture and sell in the human field; restrictions valid); Harte
& Co. v. L.E. Carpenter & Co., 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)(license to
manufacture and sell embodying patented surface ornamentation restricted to designs
not in competition with those of patent owner are valid); United States v. Huck Mfg.
Co., 227 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich. 1964), af'd, 382 U.S. 197 (1965) (license to manu-
facture and sell specific types of patented lockbolts valid); Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine
Co. v. Lanova Corp., 79 F. Supp. 102 (D. Del. 1948)(license to manufacture and sell
under patent engines "limited to stationary marine, industrial and automotive engines
with piston displacement of not more than 1000 cubic inches, aeroplane and passenger
car engines excepted" found valid).
91. See, e.g., Prestole Corp. v. Tinnerman Prods., Inc., 271 F.2d 146 (6th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960) (manufacturing licensee of patented sheet metal
fasteners prohibited from manufacturing fasteners covered by four patents, one of which
had expired; restriction invalid); Eversharp, Inc. v. Fisher Pen Co., Inc., 204 F. Supp.
649 (N.D. Ill. 1961) (license to manufacture and sell patented ball point pens may have
a higher royalty fee if no limitation as to licensee's name or trademark is imposed).
Some of these restrictions have been the basis of Sherman Act violations.
92. See In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826, 832 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 576 (1935).
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Empire Co., 9 3 the defendant, owner of patents on glassware
manufacturing equipment, leased machines to the plaintiff,
subject to the restriction that only certain types of glassware
were to be manufactured.94 The court upheld the restriction
because it is fully within the prerogative of the patent owner.95
The license, the court carefully pointed out, did not fix prices,
or limit the output of the plaintiff or the markets in which the
glassware could be sold.96 Such restrictions would be an at-
tempt to extend the patent owner's monopoly of the process
for making a product into a monopoly of the unpatented
product,97 a clear violation of Section Two.
93. 173 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1949).
94. Id. at 53.
95. Id. But see Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found.,
146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945), cert denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945), where a use restriction
on a patented process is severely criticized. In Vitamin the plaintiff had a patent on an
irradiation process for producing vitamin D and licensed the process to various food
producers. The license contained a restriction which prohibited the licensees from using
the process on certain foods, one of which was oleomargarine. When the plaintiff
brought an infringement suit, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals criticized this use
restriction because it denied many poor people the availability of a much needed health
aid. Id. at 943-44. The court, however, reversed the judgment for the plaintiff on the
ground that the patents were invalid.
96. Id. These restrictions have been the basis of Sherman Act violations. See Cum-
mer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F.2d 646 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
323 U.S. 726 (1944) and American Equip. Co. v. Tuthill, 69 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1934).
The Tuthill court cited Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502,
512-13 (1917), for the rule that a process patent owner may not fix the price of the
unpatented product of the process. Tuthill, 69 F.2d at 409. In Tuthill, the licensor
granted to the plaintiff a license to use patented brick-loading machines and restricted
the plaintiff's output to 5 percent of the total amount of brick by the licensees. The
agreement also provided that any licensee that manufactured more than its share of
bricks would be subject to a royalty penalty. The court concluded that, because brick is
an unpatented article, any agreement which restricted the amount of brick a licensee
could make was a violation of the Sherman Act. Although the court did not character-
ize the agreement as a Section One or Two violation, it did say that the inevitable result
of the agreement caused an "unreasonable restraint of commerce and creation of a mo-
nopoly," suggesting that both sections were violated. Id. In Cummer-Graham, the pat-
ent owner owned a patent in an attachment for basket-making machines. The license
agreement restricted the price for which the licensee could sell the baskets. The patent
owner brought an action for breach of oral promises by the licensee to maintain a uni-
form price fixed by the patent owner. Cummer-Graham, 142 F.2d at 646. The court
affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the case because of violations of Sections
One and Two of the Sherman Act, for the same reason given by the courts in Tuthill
and Motion Picture Co. Id. at 647.
97. This is the reason given by the courts for the rule against such restrictions. See
supra note 96. However, a recent case out of the Federal Circuit rejected this rationale.
In United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the de-
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Although much case law supports the validity of field of
use restrictions, courts will carefully scrutinize them. The po-
tential for a Section Two violation is clearly present.
III. PATENT ACCUMULATION AND POOLING
A. Patent Accumulation
Vigorous research and development produce innovations
having varying degrees of marketability. Patent protection for
inventions generated by such expensive research is to be ex-
pected, even required. In any given field, it is usual for the
research efforts to produce a number of patents relating specif-
ically to that particular field. This is especially true if the firm
concentrates its research, development and marketing into a
narrow variety of products.
Ownership of patents in a particular field of technology
begets further ownership of other patents in that field. Many
patents are improvements over existing patented inventions
and cannot be utilized without the permission of the owner of
the basic patent. Moreover, an improvement patent may be of
such worth as to render the basic patent obsolete. Therefore,
fendant owned a patent on a process for the production of ATAs, a catalytic agent and
chemical reactant. Because ATAs were known before the invention of the process, the
defendant was given a patent only on the process for making the ATAs. The defend-
ant's process reduced the cost of producing ATAs to five percent of the cost under the
prior art and made the prior processes economically infeasible. The defendant granted
several nonexclusive licenses but restricted all but one of the licenses to the use of the
process to manufacture ATAs only for internal use. Id. at 1124. The government
brought suit under Sections One and Two of the Sherman Act claiming that a process
patent owner cannot restrict the use or sale of an unpatented product of the process. Id.
at 1126. The government relied on two earlier cases, Cummer-Graham and Tuthill,
which stood for the general rule. See supra note 96. The Studiengesellschaft court re-
jected the strict rule: "No functional difference between a process patent and a product
patent supports the purely formal distinction the government urges. . .. [T]he differ-
ence between a process patent and a product patent makes no difference to the potential
for competitive harm inherent in a given restraint." Id. at 1133-34. The court thus
allows the owner of a process patent to restrict the use or sale of the unpatented product
as long as the product was produced by the patented process or machine, id. at 1133,
and there are no anti-competitive effects not sanctioned by the patent laws. Id. at 1128.
The court, though, does not provide any kind of economic analysis to support its rejec-
tion of the general rule. The court distinguishes Cummer-Graham and Tuthill on the
fact that they involved generic products in the public domain. Id. at 1134. See also
supra note 96. Studiengesellschaft, on the other hand, involved a process which was the
only economically feasible method of producing ATAs. The court thus may be re-
jecting the general rule only in a case involving unique products.
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the ownership of patents motivates the owner to acquire the
improvement patents granted to others. In addition, in-
dependent inventors quite naturally seek to sell or license their
patents to those firms having established positions in a prod-
uct market.
The mere accumulation of patents, no matter how many,
is not, in and of itself, a violation of the Sherman Act." But a
competitor having some dominance in a relevant market
should not feel free to acquire an unlimited number of related
patents and expect to do so with impunity.99 In United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., more than 2,000 shoe ma-
chinery patents were accumulated. Only about five percent of
these had been acquired from outsiders by United Shoe to pro-
tect itself from infringement suits, to keep certain avenues of
development open and to settle patent controversies that had
arisen. The court found no violation of the Sherman Act but
issued a clear warning that "[m]ost of these purposes could
have been served by non-exclusive licenses. Taking the fur-
ther step of acquiring the patents ...buttressed United's
market power. In some instances . . . the acquisitions made
it less likely that United would have competition." 10 1
No more flagrant abuse of monopoly power can be found
than that which was present in United States v. Hartford-Em-
pire Co. 10 2 Hartford had succeeded in tying up virtually the
entire glass container industry by purchasing and internally
developing all of the important patents relating to the glass
98. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 834
(1950). The court makes the statement in dictum, but it is frequently cited. See Areeda,
supra note 37, at 631.
99. Surely, a § 2 violation will have occured where, for example, the dominant
competitor in a market acquires a patent covering a substantial share of the same
market that he knows when added to his existing share will afford him monopoly
power. . . .That the asset acquired is a patent is irrelevant; in such a case the
patented invention already has been commercialized successfully, and the magni-
tude of the transgression of the antitrust laws' pro-scription against willful aggre-
gations of market power outweighs substantially the negative effect that the
elimination of that class of purchasers for commercialized patents places upon
the patent system.
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1981).
100. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
101. Id. at 333.
102. 46 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ohio 1942), modified, 323 U.S. 386 (1945), remanded,
65 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ohio 1946).
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container processes and machines. Hartford continually
pressed its dominance in the glass container market by ardent
patent enforcement against competitors, numerous cross-
licenses and persistent solicitation of licensees, who were art-
fully saddled with field of use and other restrictions. In hold-
ing that there were deliberate violations of Sections One and
Two of the Sherman Act, the district court found that Hart-
ford had not only tied up the industry, but also conveniently
divided it up by lines of containers and territory. 0 3
An interesting case involving patent acquisitions came
down recently in the Second Circuit. In SCM Corp. v. Xerox
Corp., ° SCM claimed that Xerox, by obtaining the exclusive
rights to all the patents relating to xerography and refusing to
grant license for plain-paper copying, willfully acquired mo-
nopoly power in a relevant market and purposely excluded
SCM from that market in violation of Section Two.105 With
these exclusive licenses, Xerox was able to dominate the plain-
paper copier industry for its first ten years. 0 6 The court held
that no Section Two violation was established because there
was no market power at the time of the acquisition, the pat-
ents were acquired four years prior to the production of the
first plain-paper copier and eight years prior to the appearance
of the relevant product market. 10 7 The court reasoned that
"[t]he patent system would be seriously undermined, however,
were the threat of potential antitrust liability to attach upon
the acquisition of a patent at a time prior to the existence of
the relevant market and, even more disconcerting, at a time
prior to the commercialization of the patented art."' 18 The
court also stated that, in determining the legality of the acqui-
sition of patents under Section Two, "the focus should be
upon the market power that will be conferred by the patents
103. Id. at 553. Judge Kloeb, obviously disgusted by the defendant's conduct,
stated, "I am convinced that this violation of the laws was as deliberate as any that I can
find in a review of anti-trust cases. The evidence is so conclusive that I can arrive at no
other conclusion." Id. at 552-53.
104. 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.1016 (1982).
105. Id. at 1203.
106. Id. at 1198.
107. Id. at 1208.
108. Id. at 1206.
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in relation to the market position then occupied by the acquir-
ing party. 10 9
In rejecting SCM's claim that Xerox engaged in exclusion-
ary conduct violative of Section Two by refusing to license its
patents, the court explained that "such conduct is expressly
permitted by the patent laws" and that "a patent holder is
permitted to maintain his patent monopoly through conduct
permissible under the patent laws."110 Thus, when a patent
owner lawfully acquires a patent, or series of patents, which
evolves into an economic monopoly, the patent owner does
not violate Section Two simply by refusing to license the pat-
ent or patents to its competitors. However, a patent owner
contemplating such action should bear in mind that the Xerox
decision involved a unique situation which may be limited to
its facts in future cases.
B. Patent Pooling
Patent pools are usually created by cross-licensing agree-
ments between competing firms. The purpose of pooling is to
109. Id. at 1208. (emphasis in original). The court cites Professors Areeda and
Turner for the proposition that placing limitations on the patent rights of an acquiring
party depends upon the extent of power it already possesses in the relevant market into
which the patented products enter. Id. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 819 (1978).
110. 645 F.2d at 1204 (emphasis in original). The court explained further that
"[n]o court has ever held that the antitrust laws require a patent holder to forfeit the
exclusionary power inherent in his patent the instant his patent monopoly affords him
monopoly power over a relevant product market." Id. The court then cited United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966), which set forth the elements of a
Section Two violation:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisi-
tion or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident
Xerox, 645 F.2d at 1205 (emphasis in original). The Xerox court said that the inventor
of xerography process, Chester Carlson, made 18 attempts between 1940 and 1944 to
find a commercial backer for his invention. Finally, in 1944, Battelle, a non-profit re-
search organization agreed to become Carlson's exclusive licensing agent. When Bat-
telle experienced financial difficulty it approached 36 companies to secure financial
backing. Finally, the Harold Company of Rochester, New York (later named Xerox),
agreed to assist in the commercialization of xerography. Id. at 1198. The commercial
success of plain paper copying was doubted by many. This is evidenced by the fact that
Xerox considered the possibility of having IBM manufacture the 914 model, the first
automatic plain-paper copier, but IBM declined because they thought it was a bad busi-
ness risk. Id. at 1207.
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provide prospective licensees with convenient access to multi-
ple related patents and consequent sharing of royalties be-
tween patent owners. The pool also widens the spectrum of
patents available to individual patent owners themselves.
The courts have also created patent pools to limit the mo-
nopoly power of a dominant firm in the industry. In the court
decree approving the breakup of American Telephone and
Telegraph,' the court ordered AT&T to provide to the oper-
ating companies royalty-free licenses of all patents from the
pool of AT&T patents and of all patents issued to AT&T
within the next five years.' 1 2 The court also ordered that the
operating companies be able to sublicense those patents to
others." 3 Both AT&T and the Justice Department argued
against such order. AT&T argued that to permit such would
require it to "give away its technology." The Justice Depart-
ment argued that to allow such licensing and sublicensing
would permit the operating companies to enter fields prohib-
ited by the decree and, thereby, result in anticompetitive ef-
forts. The court found that the technology was as much the
operating companies' as AT&T's because they helped finance
it. Furthermore, such licensing and sublicensing would be
procompetitive rather than anticompetitive because it would
allow the operating companies to search for competitive prices
providing an "effective counterbalance to AT&T's market
strength."'14
In the absence of monopoly power and concentration of
market shares, patent pools do not violate the antitrust
laws." 5 However, if the pooling patent owners effectively
dominate an industry, the power to fix and maintain royalties
is tantamount to the power to fix prices," 16 and they must ex-
ercise caution in drafting the cross-licenses and imposing li-
cense restrictions on nonmembers of the pool. In Kobe, Inc. v.
111. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C.), afl'd sub
nom, California v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 542 (1983).
112. Id. at 1085-86.
113. Id. at 1086.
114. Id. at 1088.
115. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931). See also
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 357-58 (1948) (Burton, J., dissenting).
116. Standard Oil, 283 U.S. at 174.
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Dempsey Pump Co., 117 an infringement suit, more than 70 pat-
ents were acquired and pooled by the plaintiffs. They had a
complete monopoly of the business relating to hydraulic
pumps for oil wells, and in fact, provided in the pooling agree-
ment that its purpose was to acquire patents relating to hy-
draulic pumps and to do everything reasonably within its
power to "build up and maintain its patent monopoly." 118
Every important patent relating to hydraulic oil well pumps
found its way into the pool, even though never used.119 The
court awarded the defendants treble damages on their cross-
complaint for violation of Section One and Two of the Sher-
man Act. 120
Where the patent pooling arrangement constitutes a basis
for an allegation of an attempt or a conspiracy to monopolize,
the courts look to the activities of the interchanges for evi-
dence of intent underlying the formation of the agreement.1 21
In the absence of restrictive practices, the courts will likely
find a lack of improper intent.122
One would expect that large concentrations of patent mo-
nopoly power into pools would precipitate suspicion on the
part of a court faced with Sherman Act attacks on such pools.
Unless adequate reasons for the pool can be advanced, the tre-
mendous leverage available to owners of the pool cannot be
defended where the owners have some dominance in the rele-
vant market. To pyramid patent upon patent is to invite Sher-
man Act allegations whenever the patent owners seek to
enforce them against infringers. The wisest path is to license
all applicants, charging reasonable royalties and keeping the
license restrictions to a minimum. An alternative would be
117. 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
118. Id. at 420.
119. Id. at 423.
120. Id. at 424-25.
121. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1015 (S.D.N.Y.
1948).
122. See Cutter Laboratories v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., 179 F.2d 80, 83 (9th
Cir. 1949) (where patent pooling is an alleged attempt or conspiracy to monopolize, a
specific intent must be shown). See also Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best
Seam, Inc., 694 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 78 (1983), where it was
recognized that a basic patent may block an improvement patent, and therefore, the
exchange of blocking patents is a reasonable purpose for a pooling agreement.
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selective cross-licensing between patent owners, as necessary,
and avoidance of a large pooling arrangement.
C. Blanket Licensing
Closely related to pooling is the practice of blanket licens-
ing, in which the licensee is required to accept licenses for a
package of patents, even though there may be a desire to ob-
tain licenses for only certain individual patents. This practice
received the approval of the Supreme Court in Automatic Ra-
dio Manufacturing v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,123 a case in
which a nonexclusive patent license agreement covered a
group of 570 patents and 200 patent applications. The Court
held that there was no patent misuse, 124 carefully noting that
the lower court had sustained the agreement as a convenient
mode of operation in a situation where the licensee wished to
avoid the necessity of determining whether each type of its
product embodied any of the numerous patents licensed.125
Although dealing with an allegation of price-fixing under
Section One of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court's deci-
123. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
124. "Patent misuse" simply refers to any attempt to use the patent privilege
outside the scope of the patent grant. Patent misuse does not necessarily constitute an
antitrust violation. It is merely an affirmative defense available to a defendant in an
infringement action to prevent enforcement of the patent rights. See Rupert, The Rela-
tionship of Patent Law to Antitrust Law, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 755, 757-58 (1980). How-
ever, patent misuse provides great potential for antitrust litigation. Cf Bendix Corp v.
Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973).
125. Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 833. Automatic Radio, a manufacturer of
broadcasting receivers, had entered into an agreement with Hazeltine Research, a radio
research organization, that did not manufacture but merely licensed its patents. The
agreement allowed Automatic Radio to use any of Hazeltine's 570 patents in the manu-
facture of its home products. Royalties were based upon a small percentage of Auto-
matic Radio's selling price of complete radio broadcasting receivers, whether they used
the patents or not. Id. at 829. The major contention asserted by Automatic Radio was
that because the agreement called for royalties to be based upon its total sales of com-
plete radio broadcasting receivers, patent misuse occurred because royalties were paid
for products not using the patents. Automatic Radio argued that this agreement was
identical in principle to a tying agreement whereby the sale of a patented product is
conditioned upon the purchase of an unpatented product. Id. at 830-32. The Court
dismissed this contention because the evil in tying cases- the extension of a monopoly
of the patent to create another monopoly-is not present in this case: "This royalty
provision does not create another monopoly; it creates no restraint of competition be-
yond the legitimate grant of the patent. The right to a patent includes the right to
market the use of the patent at a reasonable return." Id. at 832-33. The Court carefully
pointed out that the record did not present the question whether the blanket license
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sion in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. 2 6 is also important in confirming the legality of
blanket licensing. In Broadcast Music, the Court held that
ASCAP's granting of a blanket license for copyright musical
compositions to CBS was not a per se violation of Section
One. 127 Blanket copyright licenses and blanket patent licenses
are analogous.128 On remand, the court of appeals determined
that the blanket licenses did not restrain trade in violation of
Section One under the rule of reason test because licenses for
individual compositions were fully available from the individ-
ual composers.1 29 The blanket license merely provided a flexi-
ble, cost-efficient alternative to individual negotiations with
each seller. 130
Thus, courts will uphold a blanket licensing agreement as
long as individual licensing was an available alternative.
Courts will find patent misuse if there is any evidence that the
licensor conditioned or coerced the licensee to accept the
terms of the agreement. 131 To determine if there was such
would have been illegal if Hazeltine had refused to grant a different type of license. Id.
at 831.
This holding was later clarified by the Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). The Zenith Court held that conditioning
the grant of a patent license upon the payment of royalties on products which do not use
the patent amounts to patent misuse. However, as the Court explained, "[i]f conven-
ience of the parties rather than patent power dictates the total-sales royalty provision,
there are no misuse of the patents .. " This was precisely the situation in Automatic
Radio: the percentage royalty was an acceptable alternative to a lump-sum payment for
the privilege to use the patents. The Zenith Court warned that misuse occurs when the
patent owner insists on a percentage-of-sales royalty, regardless of use, and rejects the
licensee's offer to pay only for use.
126. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
127. "The blanket license, as we see it, is not a 'naked restrain[t] of trade with no
purpose except stifling of competition'. . . ." Id. at 20 (quoting White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
128. The dissenting opinion in Broadcast Music so suggests. Broadcast Music, 441
U.S. at 28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Columbia Broadcasting, Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980). See also
F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th
Cir. 1982); Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 137 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 873 (D. Del.
1981).
130. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20-21.
131. See GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1236-37 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). One of the many claims made by GAF was an allegation that Kodak had in-
sisted upon compulsory packaging of many patents as a condition to licensing any of the
patents. Id. at 1236. However, GAF did not refute evidence offered by Kodak that
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conditioning or coercion, a court will look to whether the li-
cense condition was a result of good faith bargaining between
the parties or was imposed on the licensee by the patent
holder and whether the licensee raised objections that were
overridden by the licensor. 132
IV. GRANT-BACK PROVISIONS IN LICENSES
A grant-back provision in a patent license agreement re-
quires the licensee to assign any discoveries or improvements
back to the licensor. Usually the grant-back provision is lim-
ited to the time period of the license. With the inclusion of
this provision in the patent license agreement, the licensor's
hold is strengthened on the technology in the field and the
licensee is further subordinated. Grant-back provisions have
been defended upon the tenuous ground that without such
provisions, the patent owner's position will be weakened once
an improvement patent is granted. In the absence of a grant-
back provision the patent owner would be deprived of access
to those inventions that naturally flow from practicing the
original invention. This argument may or may not have valid-
ity, depending upon the extent to which the licensed invention
is a major advance in the art.
In Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith, 133
the Supreme Court held that the inclusion in a patent license
of a provision requiring the licensee to assign improvement
patents back to the licensor is not, in and of itself, illegal and
unenforceable.1 34 This case has stood for much more in the
view of the patent bar. Justice Douglas, never one to admit to
Kodak had never imposed such a condition. Furthermore, the court dismissed the
claim by GAF that it was coerced into accepting the patent package due to Kodak's
economic power and possession of numerous patents because GAF never protested the
terms of the agreement nor produced evidence that demands for something less than
the package would have been rejected. Id. at 1237.
132. Leesona Corp. v. Varta Batteries, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1304, 1341 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). See also Glen Mfg. v. Perfect Fit Indus., 420 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1042 (1970); Hull v. Brunswick Corp., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 24 (10th Cir. 1983).
133. 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
134. Id. at 648. The Court said that such a provision is not per se illegal and
unenforceable. This suggests that the illegality of the grant-back provision was being
considered under Section One of the Sherman Act. The case, however, was not brought
under Section One but involved a declaratory judgment for determining the legality and
enforceability of the provision. The Court never mentioned Section One specifically but
only spoke of the antitrust laws in general. In addition, the Court rejected the court of
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the value of the United States patent system, served the fol-
lowing caveat in the majority opinion:
Conceivably the (grant-back) device could be employed
with the purpose or effect of violating the anti-trust laws.
He who acquires two patents acquires a double monopoly.
As patents are added to patents a whole industry may be
regimented. The owner of a basic patent might thus perpet-
uate his control over an industry long after the basic patent
expired. Competitors might be eliminated and an industrial
monopoly perfected and maintained. Through the use of
patent pools or multiple licensing agreements the fruits of
invention of an entire industry might be systematically fun-
neled into the hands of the original patentee.135
Justice Douglas may have had the Hartford-Empire case
in mind when he described the wretched state of affairs to
which an entire industry might degenerate if a single grant-
back provision was allowed to exist unchecked. 136 That the
grant-back device might serve some useful and legitimate pur-
pose was implicit in the holding of the Transparent-Wrap
case, if not in the tenor of the quoted passage. In any event,
Transparent- Wrap is at once both a precedent for appropriate
employment of the grant-back and a warning as to the conse-
quences of misuse.
Transparent- Wrap and subsequent decisions do offer some
guidelines for drafting grant-back provisions in patent licens-
ing agreements. The courts have employed a standard of
overall reasonableness that has focused on several relevant
factors. One of the most important factors identified by the
courts is the market position of the licensor imposing the re-
striction. Grant-backs imposed by dominant firms are espe-
cially vulnerable to antitrust or patent misuse challenges if
they tend to further entrench the patentee's existing market
dominance.1 37 Another factor is whether there is an evidence
appeals' contention that a grant-back provision would allow the patent owner to extend
the patent monopoly into unpatented areas, a clear Section Two violation. Id. at 644.
135. Id. at 646-47 (footnotes omitted).
136. See id. at 648. See also supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
137. This would clearly be a Section Two violation. See United States v. General
Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 815-16 (D.N.J. 1949). See also Westgo Indus., Inc. v. W.J.
King Co., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 416 (D.N.D. 1981); Van Dyk Research Corp. v. Xerox
Corp. 478 F. Supp. 1268, 1324-25 (D.N.J. 1979) (the court found that the use of the
grant-back provisions were not violative of the antitrust laws even though such use
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of the misuse of the grant-back provisions to facilitate illegal
cartel behavior. 138 A third factor concerns whether the grant-
back provisions provide a possible disincentive effect of the
arrangement upon the licensee's innovative activity. 13 9 Fourth
is the factor of to what extent the licensee and other firms
have been foreclosed from use of the technology subject to the
grant-back. 140 Within this factor is the concern of the scope of
the particular restriction"' and the duration of the
restriction. 14
2
V. FRAUD IN THE PROCUREMENT OF THE
PATENT GRANT
In Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp.,143 the Supreme Court held that the maintenance and
enforcement of a patent obtained by fraud on the Patent and
Trademark Office may be the basis of an action under Section
Two of the Sherman Act, and, therefore, may be subject to a
treble damages claim by an injured party under Section Four
of the Clayton Act. 144 It was alleged that the patentee had
aided Xerox in achieving monopoly power because the grant-back provisions were not
implemented to maintain dominance but were intended to protect the patent owner
against the competition copying of its products and to insure that it would not be
blocked from the use of inventions which might prove useful in the future). See supra
text accompanying note 136.
138. This type of behavior would violate Section One of the Sherman Act. See
Binks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252, 259 (7th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Associated Patents, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 74, 82-83 (E.D. Mich. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 960 (1956).
139. See Transparent Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 646
(1947); Old Dominion Box Co. v. Continental Can Co., 166 F. Supp. 550, 565-66
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
140. See United States v. Associated Patents, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 74, 83 (E.D. Mich.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 960 (1956). See generally Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus
Wavin, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 817, 821-22 (D.D.C. 1978), affid, 628 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
141. See Duplain Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 699-700
(D.S.C. 1977), ajffd, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980);
Chandler v. Stern Dental Laboratory Co., 335 F. Supp. 580, 583 (S.D. Tex. 1971). But
see Robintech, Inc., 450 F. Supp. at 822; Santa Fe-Pomeroy, Inc. v. P & Z Co., 569 F.2d
1084, 1099 (9th Cir. 1978).
142. See Associated Patents, 134 F. Supp. at 83. But see Santa Fe, 569 F.2d at 1099;
Old Dominion Box Co., 273 F. Supp. 550.
143. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
144. Id. at 174; Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1914). Prior to the decision in Walker
Process, fraudulent procurement of a patent had never been recognized as the basis for
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knowingly and willfully misrepresented facts to the Patent Of-
fice. The Court held that this would be sufficient to strip the
patentee of its exemption from the antitrust laws. 145
Fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office is established
when the applicant fails to disclose a fact material to the appli-
cation. 146 A material fact is one in which there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider impor-
tant enough to affect the issuance of the patent.1 47 The court
in Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp.,14 1 explained that
false statements or omissions are material, and thus fraudu-
lent, when such statements or omissions were a "substantial
cause" or a "crucial factor" in obtaining the patent.1 49
an antitrust claim but only as a defense in an infringement action. Struthers Scientific &
Int'l Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (D. Del. 1971). The
Supreme Court made it clear in Walker Process that the fraudulent procurement must
be accompanied by an "enforcement" of the patent in order for a Section Two violation
to be considered. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174-77. To satisfy the enforcement re-
quirement, the patent owner need not have actually brought an infringement suit
against the plaintiff but need only have sought or threatened such a suit. Indium Corp.
of Am. v. Semi Alloys, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 608, 614 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); Struthers, 334 F.
Supp. at 1331-32; Smith, Fraud Upon the Patent Office as a Violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Law, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 423, 434-36 (1971).
145. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177. Fraud on the Patent Office requires a show-
ing of clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence of intentional misrepresentation or
withholding of material fact. Mere evidence of simple negligence, or oversight or erro-
neous judgment made in good faith not to disclose prior art, is not sufficient to render a
patent unenforceable. Orthopedic Equip. Co., v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 217
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See also Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp.
v. Best Seam, Inc., 694 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1982) (fraud requires an element of subjective
culpability in the form of bad faith or at least gross negligence, and proof of that ele-
ment must be clear and convincing); United States v. Pfizer, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1056 (3d Cir. 1982) (government must prove that the applicant had a specific intent to
defraud the Patent Office).
146. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 217, 218
(N.D. Ill. 1983). See also Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945).
147. Kimberly-Clark, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 218.
148. 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 39 (9th Cir. 1982).
149. Id. at 40-41. The court further explained that "[tjhe proper focus in determin-
ing the materiality of information misrepresented to or withheld from the patent office is
on the effect of the misrepresentation or withholding upon the subjective considerations
of the patent examiner." Id. at 41 (emphasis in original). The importance of disclosure
was stressed in United States Indus. Inc. v. Norton Co., 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 94
(N.D.N.Y. 1980):
[A] relationship of trust exists between the applicant and the Patent Office. (cita-
tion omitted). The trust relationship is essential to a workable patent system
because the Patent Office is compelled to rely on the applicants for disclosure of
many of the facts upon which its decision are based. (citation omitted). Conse-
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However, fraudulent procurement, and enforcing or at-
tempting to enforce the resulting patent, is not a per se viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. 50 There is no violation of Section
Two of the Sherman Act unless the attempted enforcement
substantially restrains trade in the relevant market. 15'
To violate Section Two, it must be shown, in a fraudulent
procurement case, that the patentee had a sufficient share of
the relevant market to achieve monopolization or that there
was an adequate probability of a successful attempt. 5 In
United States Industries, Inc. v. Norton Co., 53 the patentee
had failed to disclose pertinent prior art during the procure-
ment of the patent, although the art was well-known to the
patent attorney. The court held that there was fraud in the
procurement, but Section Two was not violated because there
was no showing of sufficient market power.1 54
A firm with substantial monopoly power in a relevant
market must be extremely careful, in applying for a patent, to
disclose all material facts to the Patent Office. Once a firm has
substantial monopoly power in a relevant market, almost any
type of conduct to maintain that monopoly power, even if well
within the bounds of the law, may result in a Section Two
violation.1 55 A fraudulent procurement of a patent by a firm
that already possesses a stable of patents relating to a specific
quently, the highest standards of honesty, good faith and candor by the appli-
cants is required.
Id. at 107.
150. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177-78.
151. Christen Inc. v. BNS Indus., Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 928, 930 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). The Christen court quoted the Supreme Court in Walker Process:
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of trade or com-
merce under Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act, it would then be necessary to appraise
the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market
for the product involved. With-out a definition of that market there is no way to
measure Food Machinery's ability to lessen or destroy competition. It may be
that the device - knee-action swing diffusers - used in sewage treatment systems
does not compromise a relevant market. There may be effective substitutes for
the device which do not infringe the patent.
Christen, 216 U.S.P.Q. at 930. See also Smith, supra note 144, at 425-31.
152. United States Indus., Inc. v. Norton Co., 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 94, 114-18
(N.D.N.Y. 1980).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 117-18.
155. See supra notes 7, 28 and accompanying text.
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process or industry, may itself be enough to invite litigation
under Section Two.
The requirement that the patent applicant disclose all
known pertinent art during the prosecution of the application
before the Patent and Trademark Office thus imposes a sub-
stantial burden upon the patent attorney when the owner of
the application controls a dominant share of the market.156
The danger of a future claim under Section Two and possible
treble damages loom on the horizon. Even without the possi-
bility that all elements of a Section Two violation can be
proven, the equitable remedies that attend fraudulent procure-
ment are substantial. 157
VI. CONCLUSION
Section Two of the Sherman Act, the antimonopolization
statute, stands in polar opposition to the monopoly granted by
the Patent Act. The latter is an exception to the former and
is, therefore, in many instances narrowly construed. Compli-
cating this, the patent grant carries with it certain ancillary
rights that are necessary to protect the reward guaranteed by
the Patent Act. It is in the aggressive extension of these ancil-
lary rights that the patent owner frequently transgresses the
Sherman Act.
Patent licensing must be permitted if the patent owner is
to fully realize the profit attainable by the patent. Direct ex-
ploitation of the patent by the owner may not be possible.
Thus, to fully benefit the public during the patent term, licens-
ing may be the only feasible alternative. It is through licens-
ing restrictions and other conditions that Section Two of the
Sherman Act may be transgressed.
156. This burden is equally as burdensome on foreign attorneys. In Gemveto Jew-
elry Co. v. Lambert Bros., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court held that a
foreign attorney's failure to disclosure prior art to local counsel causes invalidation of
the client's U.S. patent for fraud: "Foreign patent attorneys representing applicants for
U.S. patents through local correspondent firms surely must be held to the same stan-
dards of conduct which apply to their American counterparts .... Id. at 943.
157. See, e.g., CMI Corp. v. Barber-Greene Co., 217 U.S.P.Q. 456 (7th Cir. 1982)
(patentee's failure to disclose prior art items that were more relevant than the cited art
constitutes fraud and justifies an award of attorney's fees under "exceptional case provi-
sion of 35 U.S.C. § 285").
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In order to determine whether a Section Two violation ex-
ists, the relevant product market and geographical market
must be identified. Monopoly power in each of these markets
is the power to affect prices or exclude competition, whether
the power is exercised or not. The patented invention itself
could constitute a relevant market or, at the very least, be a
pivotal factor in describing the relevant market in monopoli-
zation under Section Two. Where there is a specific intent to
achieve that power, overt conduct violates Section Two, even
if such power has not yet been acquired.
Patent licensing practices which carve out exclusive geo-
graphical territories or isolate individual fields of use may vio-
late Section Two when they are used to maintain a monopoly.
The monopoly may be that of the patent owner or a licensee.
In an oligopolistic market the monopoly will be shared but
creative licensing techniques are still sometimes used to pre-
serve the dominance of the firms in control and to restrain
further competition.
Patent accumulation and pooling offer additional opportu-
nities for the monopolist to maintain its competitive position.
While accumulated and licensed patents do not in themselves
constitute an earmark of antitrust violation, it is a key factor
in finding a violation.
In sum, the possession and use of the patent grant in the
hands of the business competitor who dominates a relevant
market must be exercised with an extraordinary degree of
care. The limitations imposed by the Sherman Act are strict,
and the sanctions for exceeding those limitations are strict.
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